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THE WARREN COURT AND CONGRESS
THE WARREN COURT AND CONGRESS:
A CIVIL RIGHTS PARTNERSHIP
Clarence Mitchell*
On December 9 and 10, 1952, long lines of men, women and
some children stood patiently outside the United States Supreme
Court. This was the beginning of the school desegregation argu-
ments. Only a small fraction got in to hear the proceedings. But
when the decision was handed down on May 17, 1954, it had a
profound effect on the lives of most of those present. Millions
who were not there were also destined to be caught up in moun-
tainous waves of change caused by the words of the opinion read
by a new Chief Justice. The Honorable Earl Warren, who had been
confirmed by the United States Senate on March 1, 1954, speaking
for a unanimous court, said that "in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."'
The significance of the words of the opinion is found in the
fact that this was a complete reversal of an evil concept of law that
had fastened itself on the country in the time of political uncer-
tainties that followed the Civil War. During that period of the
Nation's history, Congress passed measures that ultimately put
the Negro in a position to make a legal claim for equal treatment
by invoking the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution. However, the Supreme Court
systematically struck down the clear legislative guidelines that
the Congress enacted for implementing the promises of these
amendments. Subsequently, the Congress also fell into the mire
of scorning or evading constitutional safeguards.
In contrast, from May 17, 1954 to the present there has developed
a meaningful partnership between the Supreme Court and Con-
gress in the field of civil rights, with the Supreme Court setting
the direction for the course of that partnership.
* Director, Washington Bureau, NAACP. A.B., Lincoln University; LL.B.,
Maryland University Law School. Mr. Mitchell has served in the Washington
Bureau of the NAACP for 23 years. Mr. Mitchell is also legislative chairman
of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). At the time
of the opinion Chief Justice Warren had been serving on the Supreme
Court since September 30, 1953, after receiving, first, a recess appoint-
ment from President Eisenhower to fill the vacancy caused by the
death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson. The President sent the nomina-
tion to the Senate on January 11, 1954. As Governor of California,
Mr. Warren had appointed Richard Nixon (by then Vice President),
Senator William F. Knowland, the Republican leader known as a
conservative, and Senator Thomas H. Kuchel, the Republican leader
known as a liberal, to serve in the Senate before they began elected
terms. All of them warmly praised the Warren appointment.
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Before the decision, even liberal members of the House and
Senate quailed when asked the question: "Do you believe in social
equality?" Like the term "Black Power" used in the racial ex-
changes today, the words "social equality" could mean anything
from being willing to be seen in the company of a Negro on a
public street to "joyfully encouraging him to become a son-in-law."
Generally, the social equality bomb was thrown at Senators or
Congressmen who argued against discrimination based on race.
Sometimes, with an ear turned in the direction of their home state
or districts where some of the voters might think of the son-in-law
version of social equality, the legislators would hasten to explain
that they followed the "constitutional guarantee of separate but
equal." Others simply avoided getting entangled in civil rights
problems. The net result of all this was to leave the field to the
vocal and highly abrasive segregation advocates. They gave Con-
gress a low rating among most of the Negroes in the United States.
Seldom did people, other than the late Walter White, who was
secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Col-
ored People (1923 to 1955), and his associates in the organization,
think of Congress as a place to seek redress of wrongs. Mr. White,
a man with dynamic faith in the legislative branch of American
government, always looked forward to the day when Congress
would pass effective civil rights legislation. He is credited by many
as being responsible for the decline of lynching in the United States.
He waged a skillful and continuous campaign for passage of an
anti-lynching bill until he died in 1955. Year after year he worked
for the introduction and passage of legislation in the Congress. The
bill would pass the House and die from filibustering in the Senate.
Nevertheless, the debates that accompanied its consideration had
the helpful effect of generating strong public opinion against the
crime.
In 1937 Mr. White and his associates succeeded in getting the bill,
introduced by Representative Joseph Gavagan (D-N.Y.), through
the House by a vote of 277 to 119, a breakthrough which was blocked
by the Senate. The following is his account of what happened:
We found that the long struggle to arouse public opinion had
penetrated areas and created support where a decade before we
would never have dreamed of receiving such support. Southern
newspapers like the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the Greensboro
Daily News, the Danville Register, and other leading newspapers
vigorously and unequivocally urged passage of the bill. Southern
church, labor, and student bodies, particularly the women of the
Methodist Episcopal Church South, were equally outspoken. But
the stronger the Southern and national support became, the more
vindictive were the filibustering tactics of senators like Connally
of Texas, Smith of South Carolina, Bilbo of Mississippi, Russell
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and George of Georgia, and McKellar of Tennessee, aided openly
by Borah and less openly by some of the conservative Republican
senators. A seven-week filibuster in 1938 was finally successful
when an emergency relief appropriation bill to feed the unem-
ployed was used to displace the anti-lynching bill in the Senate.2
Even before the 1954 decision, most Negroes who looked to Wash-
ington for aid had their eyes on the occupant of the White House
or the Supreme Court. The names of Presidents Roosevelt and Tru-
man and Justices Black, Clark, Frankfurter and Douglas were
household words. It is a symbol of the fulfillment of America's
promise that the man most responsible for the almost reverent
attitude of Negroes toward the Court is now a justice himself,
Associate Justice Thurgood Marshall. Very early in his career,
colored citizens regarded Mr. Marshall, National NAACP Counsel
for many years, as a kind of combination of Attorney General and
Chief Justice. Even those white Americans who opposed his efforts
to achieve civil rights through the courts, exaggerated his powers.
There is further significance in the fact that he was appointed to
the Court by a President who was a Senator from Texas when the
1954 decision became news of world wide importance. When Mr.
Marshall, serving as chief counsel for the plaintiffs in the school
desegregation cases, won, the lions of the Senate and the lesser
noise generators in the House made the Capitol echo with their
brimstone oratory against Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Marshall.
On one occasion, while attacking Court decisions, Senator Richard
B. Russell of Georgia suggested that Mr. Marshall seemed to have
"mesmeric" powers over the Court.
On March 12, 1956, nineteen Senators and eighty-two Repre-
sentatives from southern states issued a manifesto declaring that
"The unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the public
school cases is ... a clear abuse of judicial power."3 Senator Price
Daniel of Texas signed the manifesto, but Senator Lyndon Johnson
did not. Eleven years later on August 30, 1967, President Johnson's
nomination of Mr. Marshall was overwhelmingly approved by the
Senate 69 to 11. It is noteworthy that one of the manifesto signers,
Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Axk.), was among those who voted
to approve the Marshall nomination. Another Senator who sup-
ported the nomination was William B. Spong whose predecessor,
A. Willis Robertson of Virginia, had signed the manifesto. Both of
the Texas Senators, Republican John Tower and Democrat Ralph
Yarborough, also supported the nominee.4
2 W. WroTE, A M CALLED WiTE, Ax AuTOBIoGRAPHY OF WALTER
WHiTE 173 (1948).
3 CoNG. Q. ALmAxAc 416-17 (1956).
4 113 CONG. REc. 12718 (daily ed. Aug. 30, 1967).
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An indication of Congressional respect for the Court's role in
giving leadership comes from Representative Richard Boiling (D.-
Mo.) who, as a key member of the House Rules Committee, has
played an important part in getting civil rights legislation to the
floor. In a recent book he says: "In the 1950's the most substantial
impact in domestic affairs was the work of the Supreme Court....
It alone behaved in a superior fashion during the period of panic
and legislative cowardice provoked by McCarthyism and internal
strains brought on by the cold war."5
EDUCATION AND VOTING RIGHTS
In a sense the vote for the Marshall nomination was a reliable
indication that, on the issue of civil rights for the American Negro,
the Warren Court enjoyed the potent political approval of the peo-
ple and their elected officials. Other examples of the Nation's senti-
ments began to appear as early as the 84th Congress. Although
President Eisenhower was not an advocate of civil rights legislation,
his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, put together a civil rights
package that became H.R. 627.6 In the 84th Congress some conserva-
tive Republicans insisted that they could not support the bill. Sena-
tor Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania initiated a move in the 1956 Republi-
can Convention to make the bill a part of the party platform. This
was done and it helped immeasurably in gaining GOP votes when
the bill reached the Senate in 1957.7 One of the principle objectives
of the legislation was to give the Attorney General power to insti-
tute civil action to protect the Negro's right to vote. The Depart-
ment of Justice already had power to seek indictments and prose-
cute offenders in voting discrimination cases, but it was reluctant
to use the powers. In his testimony, Attorney General Herbert
Brownell stressed the importance of civil action in voting cases.
At one point he said:
I cannot emphasize too much the importance of providing the De-
partment with these civil-law powers and remedies in voting and
also in other civil-rights cases. The civil remedies would be far
simpler, more flexible, more reasonable, and more effective than
the criminal sanctions could possibly be. Yet at the present time
criminal sanctions are the only remedy specifically authorized by
Congress.8
5 R. BOLLING, POWER IN THE HOUSE 193 (1968).
6 H.R. 627, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1956).
7 In his book, H. SCOTT, COME TO THE PARTY (1968), Senator Scott, who
was a Republican member of the House Rules Committee in 1956-57,
comments on his effort to have the Republican platform support the
civil rights bill and the 1954 school desegregation decision. Id. at
148-49.
8 Civil Rights Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 591 (1957).
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Some indication of how much the statute was needed can be
gleaned from a statement by Assistant Attorney General Warren
Olney, III. He said that the White Citizens Council, an organization
formed to resist school desegregation, was operating in Ouachita
Parish, La., for the principal purpose of preventing and discourag-
ing Negroes from voting. This organization was said to have elimi-
nated 3,300 Negro voters from the parish rolls "in violation of the
laws of Louisiana, as well as those of the United States."9
Eighty-three Southern opponents of the bill had issued a second
"manifesto" as soon as it was introduced. Just as they did in 1954,
when attacking the Supreme Court, and as some of the rear-guard
segregation advocates do now in denouncing civil rights laws passed
by Congress, the signers of the second manifesto resorted to sulfuric
terms in attacking the bill. The following is an excerpt from their
statement:
WHEREAS, under the guise of pious language the civil rights
bill, HR 627, proposes to establish a Commission on Civil Rights,
and to provide for an additional Assistant Attorney General, and
further purports to strengthen the Civil Rights statutes and protect
the right to vote; and
WHEREAS, the truth is that these combined proposals if enacted
into law would constitute a flagrant violation of States' rights;
would result in further concentration of power in the Federal Gov-
ernment and vest unprecedented powers in the hands of the
Attorney General, and would intrude the authority of the Fed-
eral Government into matters which under our Constitution are
expressly reserved to the States and the people.
Now, therefore, be it resolved that we, the undersigned Mem-
bers of the United States House of Representatives, conscious
of the grave and far-reaching consequence involved in it, hereby
pledge our unqualified opposition to this iniquitous legislation....
[W]e invite and urge every member of like mind in the House
of Representatives and in the Senate, where the rules of procedure
are more flexible, to join with us in the employment of every avail-
able legal and parliamentary weapon to defeat this sinister and
iniquitous proposallo
Apparently there was not a "like minded" majority in the House.
When the bill came to a vote on July 23, 1956, it passed 279 to 126.11
Senate obstruction prevented passage of the law that year, but its
chief sponsors, Representative Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y.) and Repre-
sentative William McCulloch (R-Ohio) reintroduced it in the 85th
9 Id. at 1018.
10 CONG. Q. ALLaNAc 462 (1956).
11 102 Cox. REC. 13894 (1956).
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Congress as H. R. 6127.12 It passed the House on June 18, 1957, by a
vote of 286 to 126. Although the Senate struck out a very vital
title known popularly as "Part III",13 the other parts of the bill
specifically mentioned in the foregoing excerpt from the manifesto
remained virtually unchanged. The Senate passed the bill 72 to
18 on August 7, 1957, and President Eisenhower signed it into law
on September 9, 1957.14 The law was amended in 1960.1r
One of the important developments connected with the passage
of the 1957 Act was the fact that this was the first time Congress
had been able to pass a civil rights bill in over eighty years. A
number of cliches that had been used, even by civil rights sup-
porters, were discredited when the bill became law. One standard
saying was that civil rights legislation could pass the House but
would never get through the Senate without a change in Rule XXH
of that body which requires a two thirds vote of Senators "present
and voting" to shut off a filibuster. Senator Strom Thurmond staged
an all night filibuster but was not successful in preventing passage.
Another widely held belief was that legislation which did not get
Senate approval before April or May would not have a chance for
passage, assuming that it could get around a filibuster, because from
June to the end of the session Congress would be so busy with ap-
propriation bills that it would not have time to consider civil rights
matters. The 1957 bill, as previously noted, reached the Senate in
June and was passed in August.
The Supreme Court took prompt action in overruling challenges
to the new law.' 6 The Court's posture was a great source of encour-
agement to members of Congress who wanted to seek more and
stronger legislation in this field.
12 At the time the bill was introduced in 1956, the Republican support
was led by Representative Kenneth B. Keating, who was then the
ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee. Mr. Keating was
elected to the Senate from New York in 1956. Mr. Culloch then became
the ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee.
13 The passage of the 1964, 1965, and 1968 Civil Rights Acts has can-
celled out this loss.
14 The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957).
15 The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (1960). The 1960 Act authorized
federal judges to appoint referees to register Negroes who were denied
that right by state officials. This was helpful but slow. Civil rights
advocates had insisted that examiners appointed by the executive
branch would be more effective and could reach a greater number
of people. Congress approved the use of examiners in the 1965 Voting
Rights Act. The 1960 law also provided criminal penalties for bomb-
ings and threats of bombings as well as penalties for mob action
obstructing court orders.
16 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420 (1960).
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Moved by continuing evidence of flagrant denial of the right
to vote in the 1964 Presidential elections and acts of violence, such
as the killing of NAACP State Executive Medgar Evers in Missis-
sippi, the violence against voting rights' marchers in Selma, and na-
tional indignation, Presdent Johnson called for a new voting rights
act in 1965. By that time resistance to such legislation in Congress
was insignificant. The bill became law August 6, 1965.17 It provided
for registration of Negroes by federal examiners appointed by the
executive branch of government.
The State of South Carolina promptly sought to prevent enforce-
ment of the new statute. Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi refused
to obey its provisions and the Department of Justice filed suit to
require compliance. These issues reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
and on March 7, 1966, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the
Court said:
After enduring nearly a century of widespread resistance to
the 15th Amendment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent
weapons against the evil, with the authority in the Attorney
General to employ them effectively.... As against the reserved
powers of the states, Congress may use any rational means to
effectuate the constitutional prohibitions of racial discrimination
in voting.19
Complimenting the Johnson determination to move ahead with
civil rights bills was the general assumption in Congress that, under
the Warren leadership, the Court would not evade its responsibility
to uphold legislation that met constitutional requirements. Clear
evidence of this congressional belief is found in the hearings, de-
bates and the language of the 1965 Voting Rights Section dealing
with the poll tax as a requirement for voting in state elections.
Faced with a disagreement about the provision, Congress said in
effect, "Mr. Attorney General, you can get the power you need in
a court decision." On final passage, the bill included the following:
(a) a declaration that the requirement of a payment of a poll tax
as a condition for voting was an abridgement of the right to vote,
(b) directed the Attorney General to institute "forthwith" chal-
lenges to poll tax requirements in the federal courts, (c) stipu-
lated the directive to the Attorney General was based on authority
given to Congress by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, (d) stipulated that during the pendency of
suits filed by the Attorney General against the poll tax no citizen
in the affected political area could be denied the right to vote
during the first year of his eligibility if he tendered payment of
17 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
Is South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 338 U.S. 301, 337 (1966).
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the tax for the current year to an examiner at least 45 days prior
to an election, and (e) authorized federal examiners, serving in
lieu of state registrars to issue receipts for payment of poll taxes
and transmit payments to state officials. The Attorney General
began his work as suggested by Congress, but the Supreme Court
did not seem to need any advice on the matter when it decided
the issue.19
In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, the Court concluded
that "a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or pay-
ment of any fee an electoral standard. '20
The foregoing court decisions and laws dealing with public
school desegregation and voting rights establish three important
points that should be kept in mind when considering the voluminous
and highly emotional arguments that have been devised to attack
court decisions and legislation protecting rights of Negroes in the
areas of public accommodations, equal employment and fair hous-
ing. These points are as follows:
1. Even though rules and laws regulating public schools and
voting are clearly in the ambit of state action and, therefore,
subject to requirements of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution, opponents of federal pro-
tective action fight advances in these fields just as vigorously
as they oppose federal protection against discrimination by
what they describe as "purely private action with no state
connection."
2. The Warren Court has continued to move the nation for-
ward in the area of civil rights despite the increasing inten-
sity of the attacks and the spurious charge that the Court
has exceeded its powers.
3. Leadership given by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, in
the executive branch, challenged Congress to act in meet-
ing vital civil rights problems. This, in turn, has given the
Court the kind of backing in civil rights matters that en-
courages forthright decisions affirming the right of Negroes
to be first class citizens.
19 United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (abolishing
Poll Tax in Texas elections); United States v. Alabama, 254 F. Supp.
537 (S.D. Ala. 1966) (abolishing Poll Tax in Alabama elections).
20 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
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PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
First it should be noted that while President Kennedy presented
to Congress his Civil Rights Bill in June, 1963, the task of enacting
what became the Civil Rights Act of 1964 fell on the desk of Presi-
dent Johnson. President Johnson was better equipped to accom-
plish results than any other chief executive in recent history. He
knew all of the strengths and weaknesses of civil rights opponents
in the Senate. These opponents have been the main roadblock to
civil rights legislation since the turn of the Century. As majority
leader in the Senate, he had been a hard driving leader, neither
sparing himself nor his followers. He transferred that quality to
his White House program and also did not hesitate to prod civil
right forces when he thought it was necessary to do So. 2 1
In 1964 and 1965 Congress did not have the advantage of read-
ing the Chief Justice's expressions on the "Responsibilities and
Duties of the Legal Profession". That speech was not made until
April 23, 1966, at the dedication ceremonies of the new law build-
ing of the School of Law at the University of Maryland. If that
speech had been available many senators and congressmen could
have cited it as justification for assuming that the Court would
uphold the constitutionality of bills then under consideration. These
are the words of the Chief Justice:
In seeking to meet the problems of these turbulent times, law
schools like yours face an exciting challenge. The programs which
they offer should provide the opportunity for meeting the social
problems which surround us. I am thinking not only of the so-
called bread and butter course which may be available. The law is
not just a craft. It is a profession. And it is a profession with
21 The writer of this article cites these two personal experiences.
(1)Shortly before passage of the 1964 Act, I shared a Capitol sub-
way ride with a distinguished southern senator who has long been
an opponent of civil rights, but who has usually fought fair. "We
put up a tough fight", he said, "but we are going to lose because
President Johnson is just putting too much pressure on us."(2) After passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act the President invited
civil rights leaders to a meeting at the White House. He was in good
humor. Noting that some advocates of civil rights seemed to be stray-
ing to other fields, he said: "In my part of the country it gets very
cold on the range. The cattle get weary and lie down. If we do not
make them stand on their feet they will freeze to death. So we go
around and twist their tails until they stand up. That is known as
tailing up," he said. Then pointing to an aide who was present, he
said to the group, "I want him to be in charge of tailing up on civil
rights." The President was smiling when he said it, but most of those
present knew that if they felt a sharp sensation in the dorsal region
of the conscience, when not attending to duty, the source of the pain
might very well be the White House.
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increasing responsibilities to serve society as a whole. Today's law
schools have a significant responsibility, not just to train lawyers
but to further the development of our democratic system.... For
the law schools to perform their proper function today, they must
participate in research in the law as it relates to social conduct.
There is a compelling need for creative research projects which will
afford an insight to the complexities of modern living. In this
way, the law schools can facilitate the growth of the law, which
must attune itself to the changes in our social and economic insti-
tutions.22
In addressing a New York University Law School Convocation
on October 4, 1968, the Chief Justice said:
All government agencies, local, state and national, must em-
ploy their total resources in seeking solutions to the problems of
racial hatred and discontent.... By remaining a responsive forum
of last resort for Negroes and other minority interests, the court
can assure that the spirit of the 14th Amendment will become a
tangible reality of American life.2s
The Chief Justice's message to law students in Maryland and
New York is really a kind of reaffirmation of the spirit that moved
just men to seek abolition of human slavery and an end to all of the
badges of servitude that accompanied it in the 19th Century.
Congress passed a civil rights bill on March 14, 1866. Two weeks
later it had to override a veto by President Andrew Johnson.
Among other things, this bill gave colored citizens the right "to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property."24 After the ratification of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, Congress, on May 31, 1870, reenacted the 1866 statute
with certain additions on voting, personal protection, etc.25 In
response to pleas for further protection, Congress passed another
Civil Rights Act on March 1, 1875. This law provided that:
[A)II persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, public conveyances,
on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement;
subject only to conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of
any previous condition of servitude. 26
Although the Reconstruction Congress sought to protect the rights
of Negroes, the Supreme Court at that time was a stronghold of
post civil war opposition to making the freed man a citizen.
22 Warren, Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, 26 MD. L. REV. 103,
108 (1966).
23 Washington Evening Star, Oct. 5, 1968.
24 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
25 The Civil Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
26 The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875).
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J. Patrick White, writing on "The Role of the Judiciary in a
Democratic Society",27 points out that the Court held that the four-
teenth amendment did not preclude the infringement of a citizen's
rights by another individual acting privately.28 The Court then
struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by insisting that the four-
teenth amendment, on which the court concluded the statute was
based, did not cover situations where there were invasions of rights
by individuals as distinguished from state action.2 9 Historians and
legal scholars have rightly praised the eloquent dissent written by
Mr. Justice Harlan in that case. However, within the very language
of the majority opinion were words and reasoning that would once
again help to open the door of equal treatment in public accommo-
dations. Chief Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, conceded that
use of the power of Congress to regulate the commerce would have
presented a different problem.80 In other decisions the Court set
forth the reasoning that became the legal basis for the separate
but equal doctrine.8'
Acting on the separate but equal theory, the country set up an
incredible network of rules and regulations that built physical
and mental walls between American citizens. There were separate
waiting rooms in railway stations, separate schools even in John
Brown's Kansas, barriers against use of hotels and restaurants,
and separate accommodations in some department stores.
In a 1947 publication, Milton R. Konvitz, in discussing the im-
portance of state civil rights laws, said:
In the absence of such legislation in a state, places of public ac-
commodation have the right to select their patrons and customers;
they may exclude whomsoever they please, for any reason what-
soever .... For instance, in Baltimore, where the Negroes constitute
18 per cent of the population, only one large department store ac-
cepts Negro trade and allows Negro customers to try on apparel.
In other stores two patterns are found: (1) as soon as a Negro
enters the store, a floor-walker approaches and says that the store
does not cater to Negro trade; and (2) Negroes are permitted to
enter and buy articles across the counter, but are not allowed to
try on hats, dresses, or gloves. Similar discrimination is practiced
in Washington, D.C.82
27 White, The Warren Court Under Attack: The Role of the Judiciary
in a Democratic Society, 19 Mb. L. REv. 181, 183 (1959).
28 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
29 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
80 Id.
31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Cumming v. Bd. of Educa-
tion, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
32 M. KovrTz, THE CONSmTuTiON AND Civm RiGHTS 115 (1947).
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In another exercise of imagination, numerous filling station opera-
tors refused to allow colored customers to use rest rooms available
for white customers.33
In 1954, tickets to a Navy football game at the Sugar Bowl in
New Orleans carried this statement: "This ticket is issued for a
person of the Caucasian Race and if used by any other is a violation
of state law. Such person may be ejected without penalty or re-
fund. '3 4 The Navy met the problem by selling them to all who
wanted to purchase them. This provoked an angry editorial outburst
in the South. One paper said:
Because of the agitation and the Navy's surrender to it, the seeds
are sown for what could be an explosive situation at the Sugar
Bowl. Probably there will be no serious unpleasantness-we cer-
tainly hope not-but by surrendering to NAACP pressure and
attempting to flaunt long established customs of Louisiana the
Navy has made a mistake.3 5
Although it is not clear that the Navy's action had much prac-
tical value in assuring that colored spectators would not be ejected
if they used the tickets, the occurrence prompted the Army to move
its 1957 game with Tulane University to a location outside the state
of Louisiana.3 6 This, of course, triggered an uproar among Louisiana
Congressmen, especially Representative H~bert, a powerful member
of the House Armed Services Committee. A year later he said he had
been assured that no "service academy team is automatically barred
from a bowl game because of racial segregation issues."'s This type
of backtracking on the part of the federal government is one of the
many reasons why most thoughtful civil rights advocates prefer a
court decision or a law to an executive order or a statement of
policy.
Seldom did one pick up a newspaper during the late 1950's with-
out finding an item saying such things as "Negroes arrested for
trying to use public golf course, '3 8 or "clergymen arrested for riding
in white section of Atlanta street car."39 Many people assume that
the refusal of Negroes to accept Jim Crow arrangements did not
begin until the late 1960's. Actually, the Henderson case on segrega-
tion in dining cars,40 the Morgan case on interstate travel,41 and
33 Hearings on the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
34 Chattanooga, Tenn. Times, Dec. 25, 1954.
35 Chattanooga, Tenn. Free News, Dec. 24, 1954.
36 Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 17, 1957.
37 Washington (D.C.) Star, May 28, 1959.
38 Carolina Times, Oct. 31, 1959.
39 Baltimore Afro-American, Jan. 13, 1959.
40 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
41 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
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the Delaware bus terminal decision 2 all show that Negroes con-
sistently challenged this type of injustice as they encountered it
in their regular pursuits. Also, their acts often escaped public
attention because the television camera had not come into wide
use by the news media.
After World War II and the emergence of new non-white na-
tions, an international aspect of the separate but equal problem
began to arise. Previously, most dark skinned people who came to
the United States on official visits were carefully steered around
embarassing segregation by the colonial power representatives
whose governments controlled the countries from which the visitors
came. In the Washington area visitors from India, even after that
country gained its freedom, would sometimes escape simply by
wearing a turban or a sari. Pandit Nehru, who became a life member
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
and his sister, Ambassador Pandit, usually were indignant when
they encountered segregation based on race. Inevitably, of course,
some American Negroes began wearing robes and turbans to be
accorded the better treatment given to the citizens of India. When
the African nations began asserting their independence the picture
changed. The Black Africans could not and would not pass for some
other racial group. In addition, they quite properly demanded that
they be given the kind of treatment accorded other foreign visitors.
Their indignant protests against discriminatory practices became
page one news.
The African problem was brought to the fore in a dramatic way
when K. A. Gbedemah, Finance Minister of Ghana, was refused a
glass of orange juice at a restaurant carrying the trade name of a
nationally known company. He was enroute to Washington from
New York on official business and stopped for breakfast in Dela-
ware. Although news accounts contained an implication that Presi-
dent Eisenhower did not fully grasp the seriousness of this insult
to a foreign visitor, it was clear that he felt something should be
done to make amends. He invited Mr. Gbedemah to breakfast at
the White House. The minister cancelled a trip to London in order
to accept the invitation. Afterward, he told the press that President
Eisenhower had said "little things" like this were happening "all
over the place" and one never knew when one of them "was going
to blow up".43
The fundamental difference between the Eisenhower approach to
this problem and the responses of his successors, Presidents Kennedy
42 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
43 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1958.
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and Johnson, is illustrated by the incident affecting Mr. Gbedemah.
The invitation showed President Eisenhower's personal inclina-
tion to be fair and this is further supported by some of his appoint-
ments and invitations extended for Negro guests to dine at the
White House. On the other hand, he often insisted that "you can't
change the hearts and minds of men with a lot of laws". His char-
acterization of the incident as one of the "little things" happening
"all over the place" also suggests that such things as the Supreme
Court's civil rights cases and broad federal civil rights legislation
were not high on his list of national priorities.
When President Kennedy took office he sought at once to make
his own position clear, but was reluctant to seek legislation that
would meet the problem.
The enormous pressures being built among Negroes made action
imperative. These pressures were simply an expansion of activities
that had gone unnoticed by most of the white people of the country.
The parents who demanded admission of their children to formerly
all white schools in the South or the travelers who had the courage
to take a seat in the so-called white section of a bus in Mississippi
were the founders of what is often popularly called "direct action."
Sometimes a careful look at the cases involving young people,
who were in court because they had personally challenged segrega-
tion, revealed that many of them were children or even grand-
children of persons who had been working against racial discrimina-
tion through the years.
In Maryland the Jackson children, whose names are listed in
the case that accomplished desegregation of public beaches in that
state, " raised the issue by going for a swim and outing with their
aunt, State NAACP lawyer, Juanita Jackson Mitchell. Their grand-
mother, Dr. Lillie M. Jackson, state president of the NAACP holds
a record for picketing. She was a leader of persons who won deseg-
regation of a theater after picketing for seven years in the 1940's.
NAACP leaders in Oklahoma were among the first to win deseg-
regation of state supported institutions of higher learning. 5 One
of the leaders in that state is Mrs. Clara Luper, a school teacher
and a mother. She became the NAACP's youth adviser in her state.
Her children were among the most active in attacking segregation
in places of public accommodation.
44 Lonesome v. Maxwell, 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), rev'd, 220 F.2d
386 (4th Cir. 1955), af'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
45 Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); MeLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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The 1958 Report of the NAACP carried this statement: "The
Oklahoma City youth council conducted a city-wide "sit down"
protest against segregation in lunchrooms, soda fountains and de-
partment stores which resulted in 39 stores opening their full
facilities on an integrated basis to thousands of Negro customers." 46
The 1960 Report states: "The Oklahoma City youth council was
cited by Parents Magazine as the most outstanding youth group in
the nation during 1959-60. The council received a special Parents
Magazine gold medallion and a check for $100 for its efforts in
opening up more than 100 places of public accommodation to Negro
citizens." 47
In 1960, the use of the Oklahoma City type of pressure for civil
rights was used by students in North Carolina. This attracted na-
tion-wide attention and is sometimes, although erroneously, thought
to be the first time Negroes employed this technique. In 1961 cara-
vans of "freedom riders" began to test segregation practices on
buses and in bus stations while travelling south of Washington.
Most of the riders were subjected to brutal physical attacks for
sitting in so-called white sections of buses or going into white wait-
ing rooms. John Seigenthaler, who was then an assistant to Attor-
ney General Robert Kennedy, was knocked unconscious during one
incident of mob action against the freedom riders.48 Mass demonstra-
tions of Negroes, led by Dr. Martin Luther King in April 1963, in
Birmingham, Ala., were broken up with dogs and fire hoses. As
stated earlier in this writing, Medgar Evers, the state Secretary
for the NAACP in Mississippi, was shot and killed on June 12, 1963,
as he entered his home. He was engaged in leading extensive civil
rights campaigns, including stepped up efforts to increase voter
registration. Two months before, a white Baltimore postman, Wil-
liam L. Moore, was found dead of bullet wounds on a road in Ala-
bama on April 23. He was walking through the state to protest
against segregation.
Numerous voluntary efforts were made to meet the demand for
equal access to places of public accommodation. These succeeded
at times, but many businessmen were unwilling to act without
a law.
The feelings of some who were disposed to end segregation are
set forth in a publication by the North Carolina Mayors' Cooperating
Committee. The following are excerpts:
46 NAACP, THE AlNmuAL REPORT OF THE NAACP 32 (1958).
47 NAACP, THE AxNuAL REPORT OF THE NAACP 32 (1960).
48 A. SCHLESIGE, JR., A THousAND DAYS 936 (1965).
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The president of the Chamber of Commerce, at the request of the
Mayor, called a meeting of the executive committee of the Charlotte
Chamber of Commerce to discuss what adjustments could be made
in opening accommodations-hotels, motels, restaurants, and thea-
ters-to the Negroes. This was in May, 1963.
No one seemed to know how, but all agreed that they would be
willing. However, no one was willing to make adjustments alone.
There was economic fear. The operators seemed afraid to act
alone because they did not want to be criticized individually.
Neither did they want to risk letting a competitor have any sort
of advantage.
There was subsequently a meeting of 40 hotel and motel men.
There was hesitancy on the part of some, but others were ready
to go. Concern about the possible loss of white customers and con-
cern about a possible incident seemed to be the delaying factors.
Eight decided to desegregate. The others would wait. Within a
week the others moved. Adjustment was made, completed and
announced. The hotel men agreed to desegregate their dining rooms
first. On three successive days the white directors of the Chamber
of Commerce and several other leading business, civic, and govern-
ment leaders went to lunch with Negroes as guests. In groups of
two, four, and six, they went by appointment. There was no pub-
licity. On one occasion when an out-of-town newsman sought to
take pictures for national television, the appointment was switched
to another restaurant in order that the agreement not to take pic-
tures would remain unbroken.
Attention was turned, then, to drive in restaurants. Meetings and
telephone calls brought an agreement for 18 drive-ins to begin
accepting Negroes, two groups each night, for three nights begin-
ning June 24. After that, it was hoped, general desegregation would
be announced. However, something that can never be predicted
happened over an intervening week-end. There was a big social
affair that involved several restaurant owners. Some of the dining
room owners chided some of the drive-in owners about their plans
to desegregate. By Monday several of them had changed their
minds. When the Negro groups showed up Monday night they were
turned away at 11 of the 18 places.49
On June 11, 1963, President Kennedy made a radio-television
address to the Nation in which he said:
The old code of equity law under which we live demands for
every wrong a remedy, but in too many communities, in too many
parts of the country, wrongs are inflicted on Negro citizens as there
are no remedies at law. Unless the Congress acts, their only remedy
is the street.
I am, therefore, asking the Congress to enact legislation giving all
Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the
public-hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar estab-
lishments.
49 NORTH CAROLINA MAYORS COOPERATING COmMTTEE, NORTH CAROLINA
AND THE NEGRO 55-58 (1964) (emphasis added).
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This seems to me to be an elementary right. Its denial is an arbi-
trary indignity that no American in 1963 should have to endure, but
many do.
I have recently met with scores of business leaders urging them to
take voluntary action to end this discrimination and I have been
encouraged by their response, and in the last two weeks over 75
cities have seen progress made in desegregating these kinds of
facilities. But many are unwilling to act alone, and for this reason,
nationwide legislation is needed if we are to move this problem
from the streets to the courts.5 0
Agreeing on a legal basis for a public accommodations statute
was a thorny problem. Many able lawyers in the Civil Rights field
had given considerable attention to the possibility of getting a
public accommodations law passed in Congress or establishing a
legal basis for a successful court suit.
In 1949, William R. Ming, a well known civil rights lawyer, had
suggested a possible court attack on segregation in places of public
accommodation by applying the rationale of the Supreme Court in
the restrictive covenant cases. Writing in the University of Chicago
Law Review, where he also served as a law school faculty member,
Mr. Ming said:
[Jjudicial remedies appear available for the victims of racial
segregation even in the absence of state statutes. For example, if
a Negro presents himself for admission to a privately owned place
of public accommodation, such as a hotel, and is denied admission
solely on account of his color, it has generally been held by state
courts that, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, he is with-
out remedy. But the Restrictive Covenant Cases require such a
decision to meet the test of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Supreme Court's analysis of that amendment should compel re-
versal. The decision of the state court would be "state action" as
now defined. Moreover, it is this "state action" which denies the
plaintiff damages and the basis of the court's denial of damages
is the race and color of the plaintiff. It thus follows that he has been
denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the constitu-
tional prohibition.51
Jack Greenberg, the director-counsel of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, in his book Race Relations and
American Law, discussed the possible form that such statutes should
take. He also noted that there was respectable historical precedent
in the English Common Law which bound innkeepers "to receive
and lodge all travelers and to entertain them at reasonable prices
without any specific or previous contract, in the absence of reason-
able grounds for refusal." In considering the American position on
50 CONG. Q.A ANAc 967 (1963).
51 Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Re-
strictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 234 (1949).
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this phase of the common law, Mr. Greenberg mentioned several
states which specifically rejected the common law in this area. Ten-
nessee, the author pointed out, expressly abrogated the common
law.52 Prompted by the Greenberg research, this writer checked
two earlier cases that have a bearing on the duty of innkeepers
under the common law. A 1913 Tennessee case which arose from
a boarding house owner's objection to paying a tax imposed on hotel
owners, gave a recital of the duty of an innkeeper to serve all.
After stating that the terms "innkeeper and hotel keeper", while
synonymous, do not include a boarding house, the court said:
The innkeeper, said Coleridge, J. in Rex v. Ivens, 7 Car. & P. 213,
"is not to select his guest. He has no right to say to one, 'you shall
come into my inn,' and to another, 'you shall not', as everyone con-
ducting himself in a proper manner has a right to be received;
innkeeper being a kind of public servant, having the privilege of
entertaining travelers and supplying them with what they want.53
Further American thinking on this subject may be found in a
Rhode Island decision as late as 1936. There the court said:
In Cromwell v. Stephens, 3 Abbott's Practice, (n.s.) 26, the court,
at page 36 of that opinion, defines an inn as "a house where all who
conduct themselves properly, and who are able and ready to
pay for their entertainment are received, if there is accommoda-
tion for them, and who, without any stipulated engagement as to
duration of their stay, or as to rate of compensation, are, while
there, supplied at a reasonable charge with their meals, their lodg-
ings and such services and attention as are necessarily incident to
the use of the house as a temporary home." This definition of an
inn concisely set out the position of an innkeeper as stated in the
early English cases of which Newton v. Trigg, 1 Salk 109 is an
example.54
While the cases cited did not involve the question of serving
a Negro, their statement of the law shows that the argument of
segregation advocates about public accommodation laws invading
rights of privacy of the owners of establishments open to the public
was not sanctioned in the early decisions of the British Courts when
dealing with innkeepers. At the time of the decisions in Tennessee
and Rhode Island, the courts' extensive description of an innkeeper's
duties and obligations would indicate, in those states at least, the
private right to be free from control by law in accommodating
guests did not have acceptance. As Mr. Greenberg points out, Dela-
52 J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND A-FsicAN LAW 97 (1959).
53 McClaugherty v. Cline, 128 Tenn. 605, 607, 163 S.W. 801, 801 (1913).
54 Ford v. Waldorf System, Inc., 57 R.I. 131, 133, 188 A. 633, 635 (1936).
In this case, the plaintiff was suing for a breach of implied warranty
after swallowing a piece of wood while eating beans in the defendant's
restaurant.
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ware, Mississippi, Florida and Tennessee found it prudent to reject
the innkeeper laws by statute.55 He concluded that the "innkeeper
rule as now observed in some jurisdictions seems to contain excep-
tions which might be used against Negroes."56 After listing various
inadequacies of the innkeeper laws and other common law ap-
proaches, Mr. Greenberg concluded that the best way to get at
private action would be through passage of a civil rights law.57
To this writer the cases and the statutes passed by states to
nullify the common law in this area show that supporters of segre-
gation did not intend to take any chances on giving Negroes a legal
right of entry to places of public accommodation by failure to
close all loopholes in the statutory or common law. This kind of
ingenuity would seem to indicate that results were obtained with
sufficient state involvement to warrant an attack under the four-
teenth amendment. Unfortunately, it is also my opinion that with-
out the Warren Court that attack would not have succeeded.
Although he was citing the event as a warning to alert segrega-
tion advocates, Senator Russell advised the Nation, via the Con-
gressional Record, that "Thurgood Marshall, head of the large legal
staff of the national colored peoples association" was devising a
new attack on segregation in places of public accommodation.
The Russell warning was based on a widely publicized meeting
of sixty-two civil rights lawyers at Howard University in Wash-
ington, D.C. The group issued a statement on March 19, 1960,
pledging to appeal "every fine" imposed on persons arrested because
they sought service in restaurants from which they were barred
because of race. The lawyers agreed that use of public force either
in the form of arrest by the police or conviction by the courts "is
in truth state enforcement of private discrimination and is in viola-
tion of the 14th Amendment.""8
Outside of Congress one of the most active persons seeking pass-
age of the entire 1964 Civil Rights bill was Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Mr.
Rauh, who is engaged in the private practice of law in Washington,
D.C., has given extensive volunteer service in drafting civil rights
bills. At the outset of the discussions on the constitutional basis for
the Public Accommodations title of the bill, he insisted that the title
could be based on both the fourteenth amendment and the Com-
merce Clause. After numerous conferences, organizations compris-
ing the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights accepted the Rauh
55 J. GRsENnERG, RACE RELATIONS AND A1IERIcAN LAw 97 (1959).
56 Id. at 98.
57 Id. at 112.
58 106 Coxa. REC. 6777 (1960).
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formula in pushing for passage of the bill in Congress. They refused
to take a position that public accommodations legislation had to be
based on a single part of the Constitution.59
In Congress there was a considerable amount of opinion favoring
a public accommodations statute based on the fourteenth amend-
ment. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, highly respected
by his colleagues for his views on constitutional law, was a leading
proponent of the fourteenth amendment approach. The Kennedy
Administration and many legal scholars thought that the statute
had to rely upon the Commerce Clause to avoid a legal collision
with the Supreme Court's earlier rejection of the fourteenth amend-
ment base in the CiviA Rights Cases.
It is another indication of the respect for the fairness and cour-
age of the Warren Court that many congressmen and senators
believed the Court could be relied upon to uphold a carefully drawn
statute based on the fourteenth amendment. Their view was ex-
pressed by Senator Cooper when he said:
I believe that title II should be based on the 14th amendment, and
that a constitutional right is involved where access to places open
to the general public is in issue. I believe this right would be
made explicit by the Supreme Court.60
During the arguments about the constitutional basis for a public
accommodations law, a collateral and wholly political problem was
created by opponents of the bill. They insisted that basing the bill
on the fourteenth amendment would make it broad enough to cover
"even the elderly widow, living on Social Security and meager
rents from her boarders, who might be compelled to take a guest in
her home against her wishes." Eventually, this fictitious lady became
known as "Mrs. Murphy." Supporters of the Commerce Clause ap-
proach got around this argument by exempting owner occupied
units with five or fewer rooms for rent. Many supporters of the
public accommodations measure immediately attacked this limita-
tion as a plan to gut the bill. In the end, the "Mrs. Murphy" provi-
sion was kept in the bill.61
59 Civil Rights Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1870 and 2172 (1964).
60 110 CONG. REC. 13447 (1964).
61 A similar provision was included in the 1968 fair housing legislation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
makes it clear that the 1866 statute would not permit a Mrs. Murphy
exemption to be valid under that law. Whether the decision also nul-
lifies the Mrs. Murphy provision in the 1968 law has not been deter-
mined at this time.
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Fortunately for all concerned, the long standing friendship
between Chairman Emanuel Celler of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee and the ranking Republican, Representative William Mc-
Culloch, enabled the House to resolve the problem by basing the
bill on both the fourteenth amendment and the Commerce Clause.
A similar good fellowship between Assistant Majority Leader
Hubert Humphrey and Assistant Minority Leader Thomas H.
Kuchel obtained potent legal support in the Senate for the dual
reliance on the Commerce Clause and the amendment.
Early in 1964, Senators Humphrey and Kuchel sent a joint
letter to Harrison Tweed, Esq. and Bernard G. Segal, Esq. The
letter invited the views of Messrs. Tweed and Segal as co-chairmen
of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law to submit
the official views of the committee or give their opinion "in con-
junction with other individual leaders of the bar who have had
occasion seriously to consider questions of constitutionality." Sena-
tor Humphrey inserted the reply in the Congressional Record. He
noted that it was signed by three former Attorney Generals of
the United States, four former presidents of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, four law school deans (Harvard, Yale, Vanderbilt and
Minnesota), and members of both major political parties. The total
number, including Messrs. Tweed and Segal, was twenty-two. The
letter reply contained a well documented legal memorandum sup-
porting the view that:
With respect to Title II, the Congressional Authority for its enact-
ment is expressly stated in the bill to rest on the commerce clause
of the Constitution and the 14th Amendment. The reliance upon
both of these powers to accomplish the stated purpose of Title II
is sound. Discriminatory practices, though free from any State
compulsion, support or encouragement, may so burden the channels
of interstate commerce as to justify legally congressional regulation
under the commerce clause. On the other hand, conduct having an
insufficient bearing on interstate commerce to warrant action under
the commerce clause may be regulated by Congress where the con-
duct is so attributable to the State as to come within the concept of
State action under the 14th Amendment.62
Unlike some who persist in trying to find justification for a
separate society based on race, most of the members of Congress
in the House and Senate were personally convinced that action
in this field was urgent. The factual reports on experiences of
colored citizens when they sought public accommodations had a
profound effect on Senators and Representatives. The following is
an example. It is an excerpt from a speech by Senator Bartlett of
Alaska:
62 110 CONG. REC. 7052 (1964).
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I voted for cloture only when the time came when I believed every-
thing which needed to be said about the bill had been said.... I
am a member of the Commerce Committee. For several weeks the
Commerce Committee held hearings upon a separate public accom-
modations bill .... At that time I became persuaded and was left
with no doubt whatever that such a Federal act is not only justified
but necessary.
I have one memory that abides with me out of many, one that im-
pressed itself particularly upon me during the Commerce Com-
mittee hearings. That was when Mr. Roy Wilkins, a Negro-intelli-
gent, well dressed, and known personally by many Senators-came
before the committee and described the agonies and embarrass-
ments his wife and he suffered while seeking to make a transcon-
tinental automobile trip.
That sort of thing should not be permitted to happen to anyone in
this country. I made up my mind then and there I should do my
part to prevent its happening in the future.68
In addition to staging a filibuster that lasted seventy-four days,
from February 26 to June 17, the opponents of civil rights legisla-
tion filled the pages of the Record with legal arguments against
the bill. One of the more imaginative of these writings dealt with
the possibility that a civil rights statute which had the effect of
requiring white people to serve colored people in places of public
accommodation would be involuntary servitude forbidden by the
thirteenth amendment.
Senator Sam Ervin presented "Freedom of Choice in Personal
Service Occupations: 13th Amendment Limitations of Anti-Dis-
crimination Legislation" which was published in the Winter, 1964,
issue of the Cornell Law Quarterly. He also offered "Maybe It's
Time to Look at the Anti-Slavery Amendment," an article published
in the U.S. News and World Report on May 11, 1964. Both of these
articles were written by Alfred Avins.64 Although the legal reason-
ing included in the articles took up approximately ten printed pages
of the Congressional Record, there is no indication that they were
persuasive enough to cause Senators to vote against the public
accommodation law to save white people from involuntary servi-
tude in barber shops, hotels or restaurants serving colored patrons.
Senator Ervin offered an amendment to "prevent anyone from hav-
ing to tender any service to anyone he does not wish to under the
public accommodations section, in line with the thirteenth amend-
ment abolishing slavery." The amendment was beaten 68 to 21.65
The views of the lawyers who supported the Public Accommo-
dation Law were vindicated shortly after the Act's passage when
63 110 CONG. REC. 14325 (1964).
64 110 CONG. REc. 13474 (1964).
65 110 CONG. REc. 13489 (1964).
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the Supreme Court struck down challenges to the Act. Justice Clark,
speaking for the Court in one case observed that "there is language
in the Civil Rights Cases which indicates that the Court did not
fully consider whether the 1875 Act could be sustained as an exer-
cise of the commerce power."66 Justice Douglas, in concurring, as-
serted his belief that it is better to rely in public accommodation on
"the legislative power contained in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment which states: 'The Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provision of this article'... a
power which the Court concedes was exercised at least in part in
this Act." The Douglas opinion gave a strong judicial hint that
Senator Cooper was right in looking to the Warren Court for a bold
departure from strained constructions of the past. This is particu-
larly true when one reads the Justice's view that:
A decision based on the Fourteenth Amendment would have a more
settling effect, making unnecessary litigation on whether a particu-
lar restaurant or inn is within the commerce definitions of the Act
or whether a particular customer is an interstate traveler. Under
my construction, the Act would apply to all customers in all enu-
merated places of public accommodation. And that construction
would put an end to all obstructionist strategies and finally close
one door on a bitter chapter in American History.67
OTHER IMPORTANT TITLES OF THE 1964 ACT
To the credit of Congress it should be said that sometimes
its potential is greatly underestimated. This was true when the
effort to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act began. Most of the disorder
and embarrassing displays of brutal repression by local authorities
that appeared on television screens centered on disputes about the
use of public accommodations. For some this was such an overriding
problem that they did not wish to risk defeat of the bill by adding
an amendment setting up an equal employment opportunity agency
to seek eradication of racial discrimination against minorities in the
job field. Civil rights supporters, strongly backed by Speaker John
McCormack, Chairman Celler, Representative McCulloch and other
house civil rights minded congressmen, succeeded in getting the
amendment included by the House Judiciary Committee and subse-
quently successfully fought off attempts to delete that amendment
on the floor.
To the surprise of those who sought to kill Title VII's equal em-
ployment provisions by stirring up opposition among labor unions,68
66 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 251 (1964).
67 Id. at 280 (Douglas, J., concurring).
68 110 CoNG. REc. 486 (1964).
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the legislative forces of the AFL-CIO, led by Andrew J. Biemiller
and Jack Conway, gave all out support. Without their efforts, Title
VII might well have been lost.
Title VI, requiring non-discrimination in federally assisted pro-
grams, also came under heavy attack when southern Democrats,
aided by some northern members of that party who were wary
of "bussing" and "racial balance as a means of achieving desegrega-
tion in northern schools" sought to weaken or delete Title VI. When
the bill passed with Titles VI and VII included there was some
speculation by "expert observers" that these two titles would be
used for "bargaining purposes" in the Senate and would be dropped
at an appropriate time in order to get a strong public accommoda-
tions title. At the outset of the Senate consideration of the bill,
Senators Humphrey and Kuchel made it clear that they intended
to seek passage of the entire measure. By agreement, various sena-
tors served as captains to protect specific titles of the bill. Title VI
was accepted by Senators Pastore of Rhode Island and Cotton of
New Hampshire. Title VII was accepted by Senators Clark of
Pennsylvania and Case of New Jersey.6 9 Although they had other
titles to defend, the regular civil rights stalwarts such as Democrats
Hart, Morse and Douglas also made a vigorous fight to uphold these
titles. Republicans Keating, Javits and Scott, whose entire service
in Congress is a record of supporting civil rights and Supreme Court
decisions in this area of the law, also accepted the task of defending
these titles along with their other assignments on the bill. The full
list of the captains and their assignments follows:
Senator Hart and Senator Keating on title I-voting rights; Senator
Magnuson and Senator Hruska on title II-public accommoda-
tions; Senator Morse and Senator Javits on title III-public faci-
lities and Attorney General's powers; Senator Douglas and Senator
Cooper on title IV-school desegregation; Senator Long of Mis-
souri and Senator Scott on title V-Civil Rights Commission; Sena-
tor Pastore and Senator Cotton on title VI-federally assisted pro-
grams; Senator Clark and Senator Case on title VII-equal employ-
ment opportunity; and Senator Dodd for the Democrats on titles
VIII through XI-voting surveys, appeal of remands, community
relations service, and miscellaneous items.70
It should also be noted that members of the House and Senate, for
the most part, assumed that there would be no constitutional prob-
lems on Title VII. Here they were fully justified in view of the
Court's long record of supporting the employment objectives and
congressional power to act in the field of labor relations.71
69 110 CONG. REc. 6528 (1964).
70 Id.
71 See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937);
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938);
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Title VI, of course, was generally regarded as an aid to speed-
ing up compliance with school desegregation decisions. In addition,
it had the support of some conservatives in Congress who adhere
to the principle that federal standards of non-discrimination should
apply when federal funds are spent.72
Title IV of the 1964 Act, giving the U.S. Office of Education and
the Attorney General duties to assist in school desegregation, is
further evidence of an intention of the majority in both Houses to
keep in step with Supreme Court decisions in civil rights matters.
However, the unrelenting effort of some of the opponents of civil
rights is evidenced by restrictive language written into this title.
For example, the Title requires that the Attorney General must
certify that aggrieved individuals are "unable to initiate and main-
tain legal proceedings" before he can act. Also, the Title asserts that
it does not authorize courts or officials to issue orders to achieve
racial balances in schools by transporting children from one school
to another. Although this type of legal hair splitting reflects on the
credibility of those who support it, there is much evidence to the
effect that civil rights opponents regarded its passage as a severe
setback for their cause. Senator Thurmond, for example, offered an
amendment to delete the entire Title. His amendment was defeated
by a resounding 74 to 15 vote on June 16, 1964.73
OPEN HOUSING
President Johnson moved beyond the Court and President Ken-
nedy when he sent his 1966 Civil Rights Message to Congress. After
outlining the national effort to improve housing for the American
people at all levels, he said:
The historic Housing Act of 1949 proclaimed a national goal for the
first time: "a decent home and suitable living environment for
every American family."
Railway Mail Assoc. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Steele v. Louisville
and Nashville R. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). For those who assume
that picketing and other forms of public demonstrations by Negroes
are new developments, it would be enlightening to read the Court's
opinion in the New Negro Alliance case. During the 1930's, Negroes
started so called "Buy where you can work movements" in a number
of large cities. Usually, those engaged in the movements would picket
stores or other businesses located in Negro neighborhoods but employ-
ing whites only. The defense of the owners was to get an injunction
halting the picketing. In the New Negro Alliance case, the District
Court enjoined the picketing, but the Supreme Court reversed with
a holding that the matter was a labor dispute within the meaning of§ 113 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
72 110 CONG. REc. 13418 (1964).
73 110 Cox. REC. 13926 (1964).
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The great boom in housing construction since the Second World
War is, in large part, attributable to Congressional action to carry
out this objective.
Yet not enough has been done to guarantee that all Americans
shall benefit from the expanding housing market Congress has
made possible.
Executive Order No. 11063, signed by President Kennedy on No-
vember 20, 1962, prohibited housing discrimination where Federal
Housing Administration and Veterans Administration insurance
programs are involved. That Executive Order clearly expressed
the commitment of the executive branch to the battle against hous-
ing discrimination.
But that Order, and all the amendments that could validly be
added to it, are inevitably restricted to those elements of the hous-
ing problem which are under direct executive authority.
Our responsibility is to deal with discrimination directly, at the
point of sale or refusal, as well as indirectly through financing.
Our need is to reach discrimination practiced by financial institu-
tions operating outside the FHA and VA insurance programs, and
not otherwise regulated by the government.
Our task is to end discrimination in all housing, old and new-not
simply in the new housing covered by the Executive Order.
I propose legislation that is constitutional in design, comprehen-
sive in scope and firm in enforcement. It will cover the sale,
rental and financing of all dwelling units. It will prohibit discrimi-
nation, on either racial or religious grounds, by owners, brokers
and lending corporations in their housing commitments.74
As usual, the opponents of civil rights rushed to musty pages
of ancient law to defend the right of a man "to do as he pleases
with his own property." While everyone would want to honor bona
fide requests and stipulations of individual property owners to
transfer property to friends, relatives or descendants, this is not
the crux of the fair housing problem. The municipal ordinance
passed to prevent Negroes from living in certain neighborhoods,
the enforcement of restrictive covenants by requiring Negroes to sell
property after they had made good faith purchases and the innumer-
able conspiracies to keep them out of neighborhoods by refusing
to make loans or to provide necessary services all amount to re-
straints on the alienation of property. This is analogous to problems
facing would-be purchasers of lands owned by the aristocracy or
nobility of one kind or another in the thirteenth and sixteenth
centuries in England.
The Statute De Donis, which gave birth to the fee tail estate,
must have caused a great deal of mental anguish for the lawyers
of that day before they perfected devices to convert the fee tail
74 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1254-55 (1966).
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into the fee simple and, thereby, increase the chance of making
valid transfers of title. The English Statute of Uses must have been
as troublesome as our restrictive covenants until lawyers perfected
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Tiffany points out that after the Statute of Quia Emptores be-
came the law of England it was well settled that complete linita-
tion on the alienation of real property was "void as inconsistent
with the fee." The United States Supreme Court in Potter v. Couch75
invalidated a clause in a will which provided that "no creditors or
assignees or purchasers shall be entitled to any part" of the devises.
Speaking of this clause the Court said: "But the right of alienation
is an inherent and inseparable quality of an estate in fee simple.
In a devise of land in fee simple, therefore, a condition against all
alienation is void because repugnant to the estates devised. '76 In
commenting on this decision, Tiffany says:
The real basis of the rule prohibiting a provision of the char-
acter mentioned which, by divesting, or giving power to divest
the estate created in case of its voluntary transfer, operates to
prevent such transfer, is to be found in considerations of public
policy adverse to withdrawal of property from commerce, and
the check upon its improvement and development which must
result therefrom.77
Apparently, it did not occur to some local law makers, real estate
brokers and courts that refusal to sell property to Negroes, and
even making them abandon it after taking up residence following
bona fide purchase, was also a "withdrawal of property from com-
merce."
When property goes on the open market for sale to the public,
in the opinion of this writer, the English objective of removal of
restraints on alienation is on the side of those who say "let all
buyers have equal opportunity to purchase without regard to race."
Even if one assumes for purpose of argument that the early Eng-
lish law is on the side of those who wish to retain segregation in
housing, the degree of governmental involvement in creating segre-
gation in the United States is so great that simple principles of
equity would seem to dictate that what the state created to con-
found the would-be purchaser, the state had a duty to destroy.
In a series of cases it was necessary for the Supreme Court to
strike down city ordinances which forbade Negro occupancy of
property, except as servants, in many residential areas.78
75 141 U.S. 296 (1891).
76 Id. at 315.
77 5 H. TrFFAxy, THE LAW oF REAL PROPERTY § 1343 (3d ed. 1939).
78 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S.
668 (1927); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
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Being ever resourceful, however, the advocates of housing segre-
gation quickly made use of another device known as the restrictive
covenant. The use of this device became widespread when the Su-
preme Court dismissed a challenge to these private agreements
barring Negroes from occupancy solely because of race. The Court
said the dismissal was made for "want of a substantial question. ' 79
Although the covenants were designed to "protect white prop-
erty owners," some of those "protected" found that they were really
over protected when financial or other circumstances made it desir-
able for them to sell to Negro buyers. This state of affairs cried out
for a legal remedy. There was the possibility that such a remedy
might have been found in the Supreme Court's utterance that:
"IN]either property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property
to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
to work them harm."80 Unfortunately, neither the Court nor the
general public seemed to classify Negroes as "fellows" who could
be harmed by whites using their property right and contract rights
to the detriment of their black brothers.
The harsh results of enforcing racial covenants is illustrated by
a 1938 Maryland decision ousting a colored purchaser.81 The pur-
chaser of the covered property was the Reverend E. D. Meade, a
well known Negro leader and pastor of a Baptist Church. At the
time that he moved into the new home with his wife and baby
there was only one other property occupied by colored residents
in the immediate area. The opinion of the court describes these as
dressmakers who catered largely to white customers. Located in
Baltimore City, the home purchased by the Reverend Meade was
near an adjoining neighborhood where a large number of Negroes
lived. Housing trends in the city at that time also showed that the
sheer pressure of need and numbers would soon make it impractical
to enforce the covenants in the block where the clergyman's house
was situated. W. A. C. Hughes, Jr., a leading civil rights lawyer in
Maryland at that time, included the following points in his defense
of his client's right to occupy the dwelling: (1) the covenant did
not run with the land in this case, (2) the covenant, as an agree-
ment to restrict occupancy to whites only, was a restraint on
alienation, (3) the clear indication that Negroes already occupied
adjoining areas and soon would move into the covenanted area
showed that the reason for executing the covenant in the first place
no longer obtained, and (4) enforcement of the covenant would be
a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
79 Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
80 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (footnotes omitted).
81 Meade v. Denistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 A. 330 (1937).
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In answering point one, the court said that the agreement bar-
ring Negroes had created an easement which could be used to pro-
tect white owners objecting to Negro owners and this made it
unnecessary to depend on whether or not the covenant ran with the
land. On point two the court said: "The rules against restraints
on alienation were only intended to make conveyancing free and
unrestrained, and had nothing to do with occupancy. It may be an
anomalous situation when a colored man may own property which
he cannot occupy, but if he buys on notice of such a restriction, the
consequences are the same to him as to any other buyer with
notice."' 2 Addressing itself to point three, the court noted that if
the covenanted property became "untenanted and unmarketable"
because of the racial restriction on occupancy "equity might relieve
the parties of the burden of their agreement." Point four was dis-
posed of by a holding that no state action was involved.
Perhaps the most ironic twist to this case was the court's dispo-
sition of point three. This said, in effect, that the racially restrictive
covenant provided an impregnable fortress for housing discrimina-
tion against colored buyers, but, if the white owner suffered a fi-
nancial loss because he could not sell or rent to a member of his race,
equity might provide a kind of postern gate through which he could
pass the fee or the right of occupancy to a Negro.
Some do not remember the cruel, the capricious and the tragic-
comic aspects of covenants prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sions halting their enforcement. In addition to the foregoing facts
about the Meade case, it would be well to recall the following other
illustrations of the unjust happenings surrounding the individuals
who sought relief by going to the nation's highest court.
In Shelley v. Kraemer, 3 the Court pointed out that the covenant
barring Negroes from the area was actually entered into at a time
when members of that race were resident owners of dwellings lo-
cated therein. Under the terms of the covenant the Supreme Court
pointed out: "Not only does the restriction seek to proscribe use
and occupancy of the affected properties by members of the ex-
cluded class, but as construed by the Missouri Courts, the agree-
ment requires that title of any person who uses his property in
violation of the restriction shall be divested. 8 4
Another illustration of absurdities based on legal principles is
found in an Ohio case holding that a minister of a church could not
occupy the parsonage because he was a Negro while, on the other
82 Id. at 307, 196 A. at 335.
83 Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
84 Id. at 10.
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hand, the congregation, which was all Negro, was free to use the
church part of the property because the title of ownership was in
a religious corporation "which has no race." The Supreme Court
reversed the Ohio decision in Trustees of Monroe Avenue Church v.
Perkins.85
The extent of governmental involvement in establishing hous-
ing segregation is well documented in many reports and writings.
In 1961, the Commission on Civil Rights published a report which
said:
Federal policy in the field of housing reflected and even magnified
the attitudes of private industry. The [FHA] Manual recommended
the use of restrictive covenants to insure against "inharmonious"
racial groups! When HOLC acquired homes in white neighbor-
hoods and offered them for sale, Negroes could not buy them.80
One description of the federal government's position is as fol-
lows. "It is hardly to the credit of the federal government that
upon its entrance onto the housing scene in 1934, the spread of
these (restrictive) covenants was accelerated. One commentator has
characterized the Federal Housing Administration in its early years
as 'a sort of typhoid Mary' for racial covenants."87
Perhaps the most impressive demonstration of the skill of real
estate interests bent on imposing restrictions is found in the pro-
gram mentioned by the Civil Rights Commission in describing a
Grosse Pointe, Michigan, plan. The Commission report said:
Organized brokers have, with few exceptions, followed the prin-
ciple that only a "homogeneous" neighborhood assures economic
soundness. Their views in some cases are so vigorously expressed
as to discourage property owners who would otherwise be con-
cerned only with the color of a purchaser's money, and not with
that of his skin. Moreover, these views sometimes find elaborately
systematic expression, as in the well-publicized program in Grosse
Pointe, Mich. There, discrimination covered the full ambit of
"race, color, religion, and national origin," and it was practiced
with mathematical exactitude. Two groups, the Grosse Pointe
Brokers Association and the Grosse Pointe Property Owners Asso-
ciation had established and maintained a screening system to win-
now out would-be purchasers who were considered "undesirable."
As Michigan Corp. and Security Commissioner Lawrence Gubow
put it to the Commission:
85 334 U.S. 813 (1948). See also Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Four-
teenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REV.
203, 204 & n. 5 (1949).
80 UNITED STATES COMMvISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT No. 4, HOUSING
16-17 (1961).
87 Semer and Sloane, Equal Opportunity and Individual Property Rights,
24 Fed. B.J. 51 (1964).
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A passing grade was 50 points. However, those of Polish
descent had to score 55 points; southern Europeans, includ-
ing those of Italian, Greek, Spanish, or Lebanese origin had
to score 65 points, and those of the Jewish faith had to
score 85 points. Negroes and orientals were excluded
entirely.
Similar exclusions are accomplished in other communities, though
usually with less refinement than in Grosse Pointe.88
Of course most of these policies were changed after the Supreme
Court outlawed enforcement of restrictive covenants, but by that
time the pattern of housing segregation was nation-wide and firmly
entrenched.
The Commission also pointed out that:
Among the four federal agencies that supervise financial institu-
tions, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System acknowledge-at least im-
plicitly-that racial and religious discrimination in mortgage lend-
ing does occur among the institutions they supervise. The Comp-
troller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion disclaim any knowledge of such discrimination.... The Federal
Home Loan Bank Board is the only one of these four agencies that
had adopted a policy of opposing discrimination.8 9
Representatives of the Civil Rights Commission presented this
and other evidence during the hearings on the proposed fair hous-
ing statute.
When all else failed, the real estate interests and public officials
joined forces in establishing firm working agreements which simply
barred would be rentors or purchasers solely because of race. Dur-
ing the long struggle for fairness in the sale and rental of property
the value of one legal weapon remained a question mark.
In 1866, after the adoption of the thirteenth amendment, Con-
gress sought to assure protection of the freedman's right to pur-
chase, rent and hold real or personal property.
In the quiet detachment of law libraries and legal seminars
scholars could read the debates that led to the approval of this
law, they could consider the intention of Congress to remove the
badges of slavery and, above all, they could see the plain meaning
of English language in the statute. But, unfortunately, the courage
that permits free expression in a drawing room is seldom found in
legislative bodies and the courts. Both Congress and the pre-
Warren Supreme Court adroitly ignored or downgraded this law.
88 U.S. CoamssioN ON CL RIGHTs, REPORT No. 4, HousnrG 2-3 (1961).
89 Id. at 79.
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The battle for passage of the 1968 Housing provision began in
1966 when President Johnson called on civil rights leaders to inform
them that he was about to "whip the teacher" and needed their
help.90
Some members of Congress favored a plan of action that would
pass fair housing problems to the Supreme Court. They felt
that the political risks in this area were too great. In effect, they
were overruled when the President called for passage of a civil
rights bill that would include a fair housing title.
Throughout the many discussions in which this writer partici-
pated, there seldom, if ever, arose doubt about the constitutionality
of a fair housing statute nor of the Supreme Court's eventual ap-
proval of such a law.
In the 1966 hearings before the House Judiciary Committee per-
haps the most prophetic testimony was presented by Professor
Mark DeWolfe Howe of the Harvard Law School. He suggested,
and was later vindicated by the Supreme Court in Jones v.
Mayer,9' that Congress had the power to base a fair housing law on
the thirteenth amendment.92 The redoubtable Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.,
testifying this time as counsel for the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, gently reminded the committee that he had been right
in advising that the 1964 Civil Rights bill could rest on the Com-
merce Clause and the fourteenth amendment. He asserted that a fair
housing law could stand on the same legal foundation.93
Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, also fortified by
Court decisions upholding his legal arguments presented to Con-
gress in favor of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, suggested that he did
not intend to seek a law prohibiting racial discrimination that would
90 When the President used that expression the writer of this article
was intrigued and asked about the background. The President then
told this story. He said that as a boy in Texas he and some of his
friends decided that they would give an unpopular but large and
muscular male teacher a whipping. All of the would-be teacher
whippers gathered at a bridge to make a joint and simultaneous
attack on the target. The President said that he was the first to grab
the teacher but he added: "When I looked over my shoulder I saw
my buddies running over a hill and I was all alone." When the
laughter among the listeners ended, the President circled the room
with a steady gaze and said: "When we get into this fight, I don't
want to look over my shoulder and find some of you fellows running
over the hill." The writer regrets that some of those present did "run
over the hill" but those of real conviction continued and battled until
victory was won in Congress.
91 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
92 Civil Rights Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1560-81 (1966).
93 Id. at 1543.
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be based solely on the Commerce Clause because he thought it
would be "equally justifiable as an implementation of Section V of
the 14th Amendment."94
Among those appearing against the fair housing legislation was
W. B. Hicks, executive secretary of the Liberty Lobby. He was
accompanied by Dr. Alfred Avins, who seemed undaunted by the
short shrift Congress had given his anti-civil rights arguments in
its consideration of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill.
Dr. Avins carried the main burden of the testimony which cov-
ered ten pages of the hearing record. One of the more intriguing
sections of the Avins' argument, submitted for the record, is as
follows:
[T~he small Negro minority which these laws benefit is precisely
the group not in need of them to secure good housing. In short,
this legislation is pro bono social climbers and nothing more.
Invoking such laws for their benefit is like enforcing minimum
wage legislation for Elizabeth Taylor. 95
Testimony at the 1967 Senate Hearing offers these sharp refuta-
tions of Dr. Avins' observations about "social climbers." Dr. Robert
C. Weaver, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, testified that 1960 figures showed that "Three times
as large a proportion of non-white families, 28 per cent, lived in
overcrowded homes, as did white ... and this overcrowding was
prevalent in all income classes."96 Two Negro witnesses told of their
individual problems. Lt. Carlos Campbell, a Navy flyer assigned to
intelligence duty at the Pentagon, told the hearing group that most
of the housing in the immediate area was for whites only. A poig-
nant excerpt from his testimony is as follows:
I have had cause to reexamine my philosophy and recognize the
fact that the status afforded me as a naval officer can abruptly fall
once I leave the base. It seems incongruous that I could be en-
trusted with the responsibility of navigating a multi-million dollar
airplane, which was the case in Patrol Squadrons 22 and 19... or
with reviewing and approving millions of dollars worth of con-
struction projects and master plans, as it is the case now with the
Naval Air Systems Command. 97
Gerard A. Ferere, a former naval officer, but at that time teach-
ing French and Spanish at St. Joseph's College in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, told of his experiences in trying to buy a home. In
94 Id. at 1178.
95 Id. at 1618.
96 Hearing on the Fair Housing Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1967).
97 Id. at 194.
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one instance he estimated that, in avoiding selling a house to him,
the white seller was evidently willing to take a loss of $1,600 by
transferring the property to a white person.9 8
If one wished to rely merely on the very ancient and honorable
doctrine that public policy is against withdrawal of property from
commerce, some compelling evidence was offered by two business-
men on the need for legislation to support that policy.
William J. Levitt, President of Levitt and Sons, Inc., said his
company had adopted an open occupancy policy in some areas of
the country and it had resulted in a five fold increase in sales vol-
ume during a five year period. He gave the sales volume for the
fiscal year of 1965-66 as seventy-five million dollars. He candidly
admitted that he did not have an open occupancy housing policy in
Maryland which did not have an open occupancy law at that time
because: "[A]ny home builder who chooses to operate on an open
occupancy basis, where it is not customary or required by law, runs
the grave risk of losing business to his competitor who chooses to
discriminate."99
Mr. Levitt was followed later by James W. Rouse, President of
the mortgage banking firm of James W. Rouse and Co., Inc. of
Baltimore, Maryland. He said:
The public accommodations law may have been more important
for the protection it gave those who wanted to open their facilities
to all the market than for the pressures it imposed upon unwilling
operators. Such is the case in housing. It is my honest belief that
the preponderance of real estate developers and home builders
would prefer to operate in a fully open market, but fear the results
of going it alone. 00
Although real estate interests failed to stop the fair housing bill
in the House in 1966, they did succeed in causing so much delay
that the Senate, with some members busy campaigning for re-elec-
tion, did not act.
Real estate interests and others who favor segregated housing
then moved into the 1966 Congressional campaign for the purpose
of defeating those who had supported the bill in the 89th Congress.
By and large the anti-fair housing forces did not make many "heads
roll" on the housing issue, but in fairness to House members, who
had carried the major part of the burden in 1966, supporters of the
bill made a tactical decision to seek passage first in the Senate and
.hen in the House during the 90th Congress.
98 Id. at 205.
99 Civil Rights Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1534 (1966).
100 Id. at 1582.
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Of course there were cautious persons who voiced reservations
about wording and implementation, but the general feeling was
optimism toward court approval, if the law could be passed, and
pessimism toward the possibility of passage. The feeling of confi
dence in the constitutionality of the law was firmly expressed by
the Attorney General during Senate hearings on the bill and its
principle sponsors, Senators Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota and
Edward M. Brooke of Massachusetts. By this time the opponents of
civil rights had unsuccessfully used most of their best arguments
against public accommodation legislation and they based most of
their appeal on naked racial bigotry.10 1
Mr. Ramsey Clark had succeeded Mr. Katzenbach at the time the
1967 Senate hearings began. Mr. Clark again emphasized the encour-
agement given by the United States Supreme Court to Congress in
this part of his testimony before the Subcommittee on Housing and
Urban Affairs of the Committee on Banking and Currency:
Evidence presented before the subcommittees of both Houses
last year clearly established the constitutional basis for this legis-
lation.
It was shown that the housing business is substantially inter-
state and subject to the commerce clause. Millions of outstanding
mortgages are held by lenders who reside in different States from
the mortgaged housing. Hardly a home is built which does not con-
tain materials produced in other States. The average family moves
its place of residence once every 5 years, and 1 out of 6 moves is
101 In one letter to its members, the National Association of Real Estate
Boards said: "We are devoting our budget now to production for the
free leaflet, 'An Urgent Message to Every Homeowner,' which is being
printed in the millions." Letter from NAREB to Board Presidents and
Secretaries; Copy on file Washington, D.C. Bureau, NAACP.
In its March 11, 1968, publication "Realtors Headlines", the NAREB
said that "the right of every homeowner is being bargained away
under the guise of civil rights." 35 REALTORS HEADLnmES No. 11, p. 1
(March 11, 1968).
The Louisiana Realtors put a full page ad in the Times-Picayune
on March 15, 1968, which proclaimed "the House of Representatives
in Washington, D.C., is debating a so-called open housing amendment
to the pending civil rights bill If enacted by the House and signed
by President Johnson, this new law will forever destroy the basic
American right of allowing property owners to rent or dispose of
their property as they see fit. Send a Telegram to Hale Boggs or
Eddie H6bert or whomever else is the U.S. Representative from your
Congressional District supporting the fight against this dangerous
and unconstitutional legislation." The Times-Picayune (New Orleans),
March 15, 1968, § 2, at 16. See Appendix for example.
It is interesting to note that although Mr. H~bert followed the cus-
tomary southern pattern of voting against fair housing, Mr. Boggs
voted for the bill in spite of the deluge of propaganda in his state.
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across a State line. Production and employment depend on the
movement of workers and executives from one State to another.
Advertising for new housing often crosses State lines.
The 14th amendment provides a firm constitutional base for leg-
islation eliminating discrimination in housing. Government action
of the past has contributed heavily to discriminatory housing prac-
tices. Until 1947 the Federal Government fostered discrimination
in housing by encouraging and often requiring restrictive racial
covenants in deeds where Federal mortgage insurance or guaran-
tees were sought. Until 1948 courts enforced private restrictive
racial covenants. Even today many State-licensed real estate agents
refuse to show Negroes homes in all-white neighborhoods.
Last May in Reitinan v. Mulkey, 35 U.S.L. Week 4473, U.S., May
20, 1967, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of California's
highest court that the amendment to the State constitution popu-
larly known as Proposition 14 "involved the State in private racial
discriminations to an unconstitutional degree." The right to dis-
criminate, the Supreme Court found, had been "embodied in the
State's basic charter."
This particular "State action" has been invalidated by the courts,
but the case illustrates both the justification and the need for legis-
lation to enforce the guarantees of the 14th amendment.
Last year the Supreme Court, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, demonstrated how firm a base the 14th amendment is for this
bill.
Congress has the constitutional authority and duty to remove
whatever it reasonably considers to be a barrier to equal protection
of the law, even if the barrier is a product of individual action.
Mr. Justice Cardozo told us 30 years ago that, "property, like
liberty, though immune under the Constitution from destruction,
is not immune from regulations essential for the common good.
What the regulations should be," he said, "every generation must
work out for itself."
Our generation must give its answer to the pervasive problem
of segregated housing now.
We believe that this bill is the answer, Mr. Chairman.102
From the beginning of the fight in 1966, this writer believed
that there were sufficient votes in Congress to pass a fair housing
law and that such a statute would be upheld by the Supreme
Court. This belief was based, in part at least, on faith in President
Johnson's ability to "count votes" and his tenacity in working
for legislative objectives. On my office wall there is a picture of a
meeting with the President and a favorite pet at that time, a dog
of uncertain ancestry named Yuki. So far as I was concerned there
were two purposes for the meeting. The first was to thank the
President for his appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall to the
Supreme Court. The second was to exchange ideas on how we
would get Senate passage of the fair housing law which had been
102 Hearings on the Fair Housing Act of 1967 Before the Subcomm. on
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1967).
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passed in a restricted form in the House in 1966, but died in the
Senate. The President responded to the first by saying nobody had
asked him to appoint Mr. Justice Marshall. He said he had made his
own decision to name the Justice because of his outstanding ability
and the contribution he could make on the Court. I asked and was
given permission to quote President Johnson on this. On the second
matter of the Housing legislation, he struck his chair arm with his
fist, looked me in the eye and said: "We have got to get that bill
through and it must cover all housing." I left the White House
with renewed belief that the Johnson skill would again prevail
and that the Supreme Court would again affirm the constitutionality
of a well drawn civil rights law. During the fight for the 1964
Civil Rights law, the chief problem in the Senate was how to win
Senator Everett Dirksen over to a vote for cloture. In 1966 the
Senator was important, but the addition of some new faces in the
Senate also improved the outlook. These individuals worked and
planned like the southern opposition in its most halcyon days.
The 1968 Civil Rights Bill, which includes the fair housing law,
passed the Senate by a vote of 71 to 20 on March 11, 1968. Passage
of the unchanged Senate bill was accomplished in the House on
April 10 by a vote of 250 to 172. These heavy majorities in favor of
the bill make it safe to predict that there will be good public accept-
ance of this legislation and it will accomplish its purpose when
effectively enforced.
After passage of the bill there came the pleasant, but not wholly
unexpected, announcement of the Supreme Court's decision apply-
ing the 1866 statute. Perhaps the most refreshing aspect of the
Court's decision was its reliance on the thirteenth amendment.
From that point on it would not be necessary to mention that
amendment in a semi-apologetic manner when talking about vindi-
cating civil rights.
The Court had read the plain words of the English language
and concluded that when slavery was abolished in this country
Congress meant to give the freedmen first class citizenship. A hun-
dred years labor by those who really meant to build a united nation,
blind to color, had proven not to be in vain.
In this writer's opinion the Jones °3 decision will open new doors
for legislative advances in the field of civil rights. Particularly,
it should be of great assistance in closing any loopholes in existing
laws such as the 1964 Public Accommodations Act and the new
housing statute.
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CONCLUSION
Perhaps the best way to conclude an article of this kind is to
quote the words of a man who is a living example of the spirit that
motivates the Warren Court. He served the country as Secretary
of Labor, was appointed to the Supreme Court and voluntarily
stepped from the bench to fulfill a responsibility as the American
Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Justice Goldberg, now
speaking as a private citizen, said this to the 55th Annual Meeting
of the American Judicature Society:
"It is imperative that we recognize that if the law is really to
come to grips with the problems of racial discrimination and pov-
erty, it must make itself felt not at the end of a policeman's night-
stick, it must manifest itself in just and equitable provisions for
righting of wrongs.' 10 4
This is the spirit of the Warren Court and the Justices who
have participated in the affirmation of the great principles con-
tained in the recent civil rights decisions mentioned herein.
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AN UN-BIASED LOOK
AT "OPEN-HOUSING"
Don't Let A Basic American Freedom Go Down the Drain
This urgent message is directed to-
wards every citizen-white, colored, or
Oriental-who owns or rents any kind
of real property.., a home which he
occupies himself, a residence rented to
others, an apartment house or duplex,
a business place, even a vacant lot.
At this precise moment, the House of
Representatives in Washington, D. C. is
debating a so-called "open housing"
amendment to the pending civil rights
bill. An identical measure has already
cleared the Senate.
If enacted by the House and signed
by President Johnson, this new law
will forever destroy the basic American
right of allowing property owners to
rent or dispose of their properties as
they see fit. This means that the Fed-
eral Government could force you to
rent or sell to a person not of your
choice. If you insisted on not renting or
selling, you could be brought before
Federal enforcement agencies or the
Federal courts.
Forgetting the race issue, suppose
you own, but don't occupy, a neat little
double cottage. The mortgage is paid
and you and your wife have invested
considerable money fixing it up prior
to offering it for rent.
Along comes some family with a
half-dozen undisciplined, highly de-
structive children. They have just been
evicted by another landlord for making
a shambles of his house and now they're
primed and ready to use your spar-
kling clean place for their own private
version of Vietnam. You advise them,
as diplomatically as possible, that you
do not want them for tenants.
In the meantime, they find out that
you and they are of different religious
beliefs, and they charge you with vio-
lating the open housing act by dis-
criminating against them because of
religion. However justifiable your rea-
sons, you could be required to assert
those reasons before a Federal Agency,
at your own expense.
Far fetched?? Not at all.
You're in serious trouble and you got
there simply because-either innocently
or unconsciously-you tried to uphold
what you thought was your traditional
American freedom of choice.
We are in favor of everybody being
able to obtain decent housing, but not
at the expense of taking away from any
American his basic right of freedom of
choice. This is the essence of private
property ownership.
As property owners ourselves, we
are anxious to know how, in the name
of a free country, can any legislation
such as this be seriously considered.
We think this question is being asked
by Americans everywhere and that it
must be put squarely before the people
we have elected to serve as our spokes-
men in the Congress.
If you agree, then you should take
immediate action to see that "forced
housing" (which is what it really is)
doesn't become the law.
Send a telegram to Hale Boggs or
Eddie Hfbert or whomever else is the
U. S. Representative from your Con-
gressional District, supporting the fight
against this dangerous and unconstitu-
tional legislation.
In addition to a wire, fill in the
form printed at the bottom of this page,
put it in a stamped envelope, address
it to your Congressman, and send it to
him without delay.




1 F. Edward H~bert New Orleans2 T. Hale Boggs New Orleans
3 Edwin E. Willis St. Martinville
4 Joe D. waggoner. Jr. Plain Dealing
5 Otto E. Passnan Monroe6 John R. Rarick Baton Rouge
7 Edwin W. Edwards Crowley
8 Speedy 0. Long Jena
Hon. M. C.(insert Representative's Name)
House Office Building
Washington, D. C.
I am strongly opposed to the "open
housing" amendment to the proposed civil
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